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The Rise and Fall of Duress (or How Duress Changed Necessity Before Being Excluded by Selfdefence)
Steve Coughlan, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University
The first three months of 2013 saw two significant events for the law of defences: the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in R v Ryan, clarifying the statutory and common law defences of
duress and the relationship between them, and the proclamation of Bill C-26, The Citizen’s
Arrest and Self-defence Act, bringing in a new statutory version of self-defence. In this paper I
want to discuss the significance of those specific occurrences in their own right, but in addition
to consider the impact that they have on defences more generally.
In particular, I suggest two separate conclusions should be drawn. First, one implication of the
decision in Ryan is that the defence of necessity must be re-evaluated. The Court has long held
that duress and necessity are essentially similar: the more sophisticated understanding of the
former therefore casts light on how better to understand the latter. Second, I want to argue that
although Ryan satisfactorily resolved difficulties that had plagued duress for forty-six years, that
solution has been arrived at just in time to be undone by the passage of Bill C-26.
My argument will proceed in three parts.
First, in Part One I shall consider the Supreme Court’s observation that self-defence, necessity
and duress are “essentially similar”.1 I shall point out broadly why this is true and what it means
for the relationship between those three defences. This discussion will, in dealing with selfdefence, consider the statutory provisions which have just been repealed.
Second in Part Two I shall turn to look in detail at the changes which have been made to the
defence of duress, over the past forty-six years but most importantly in the very sensible decision
in Ryan. I shall do so in part because it is helpful to understand duress in its own right. In
addition, however, this discussion will be significant for the defence of necessity. I shall argue
that the developments in the law of duress as explained in Ryan demand that similar changes be
made to the defence of necessity.
Finally, in Part Three, I shall turn to the new self-defence provision, and discuss how it changes
the relationship between the defences which was discussed in the first part. I will argue that, for
the very reasons explained in Ryan in speaking of the old provisions, the new self-defence
provision renders common law duress largely irrelevant.

R v Ryan, 2013 SCC 3, para 17: “All three apply in “essentially similar” situations: each is concerned with
providing a defence to what would otherwise be criminal conduct because the accused acted in response to an
external threat”.
1

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2323766

Ironically, then, some of the problems which were solved by Ryan have been, weeks later, reintroduced by Parliament.
Part One: The “Essentially Similar” Defences of Necessity, Self-defence, and Duress
The overall structure of each of necessity, self-defence and duress is the same: because of some
trigger, the accused responds by committing an offence. As the Supreme Court has observed,
“self-defence, necessity and duress all arise under circumstances where a person is subjected to
an external danger, and commits an act that would otherwise be criminal as a way of avoiding
the harm the danger presents.”2
In the case of necessity, the Court has held that if an accused faced urgent circumstances of
imminent peril, had no reasonable legal alternative, and the harm caused by the accused is
proportional to the harm avoided, then the accused is entitled to a defence for committing an
offence.3
The recently-repealed version of self-defence is difficult to encapsulate simply - which is, it must
be noted, one of the reasons it was repealed.4 As an example, however, one might consider
section 34(2), the provision most often applied in the case of the use of deadly force in selfdefence. It provided that if a person was unlawfully assaulted, reasonably feared death or
grievous bodily harm from that assault, and reasonably believed that there was no other method
of self-preservation, then that person could cause death or grievous bodily harm in repelling the
assault.
Finally, consider duress. It exists in statutory and common law form, and one of the points to be
pursued in this paper is the way in which the Court has recently harmonized those two versions:
accordingly we shall consider its precise requirements at some length later in the paper. For the
moment it is enough to note the essence of the defence of duress: that if a person is ordered to
commit an offence under threat of serious harm, has no reasonable way to avoid committing the
offence, and the harm caused will be proportional to that avoided, then the person has a defence
for committing the offence in question.5
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R v Hibbert , [1995] 2 SCR 973, para 50.

3

Perka v The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232.

The Supreme Court observed in R v McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, para 16, that ss 34-37 were “unbelievably
confusing”.
4
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This was the point which was, of course, authoritatively determined in Ryan, note 1:
{2}...the defence of duress is available when a person commits an offence while under compulsion of a
threat made for the purpose of compelling him or her to commit it. (emphasis in original)
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The primary difference between these three defences is the limitation (or lack thereof) on the
trigger and the response. In the case of necessity, the trigger is any urgent situation of imminent
peril, and the response is to commit some offence. In the case of the recently-repealed versions
of self-defence, the trigger was an assault by another person, and the response was to assault that
person.6 In the case of duress the trigger is a threat from another person made for the specific
purpose of compelling the accused to commit an offence, and the response is to commit that
offence.
Let us look at that same information presented in chart form:
Trigger
Necessity

Response

an urgent situation of imminent peril

Self-defence an assault
Duress

commit some offence
commit assault

a threat of death or bodily harm unless
one commits a particular offence

commit the particular offence

Presenting the requirements for the defences in this way helps make clear the relationship
between them. Specifically, it shows that there is a sense in which necessity is the general case,
while self-defence and duress are both special instances of it. That is, in necessity the potential
triggers are broad and open-ended, and the response is equally open-ended. Self-defence and
duress, on the other hand, have a specific trigger and allow a specific response.
This is a reflection of what the Supreme Court meant when they observed that “[d]uress
is...merely a particular application of the doctrine of ‘necessity’.”7 Duress is a subset of
necessity, since its trigger and its response both fall within the general categories defined by
necessity. The same could, subject to an elaboration below, be said of the old self-defence
provisions – the urgent situation was the assault by another person, and the particular offence
committed was an assault on that person.
Reflected as a diagram, then, one might tentatively (but not finally) represent the relationship
between the three defences as this:

6

Criminal Code, RSC 1985 c C-46, ss 34-37. This is of necessity something of an oversimplification. However,
sections 34(1), 34(2) and 35 all required that the accused had been assaulted: section 37 also allowed for the
possibility that the accused was using force to “prevent the assault”.
7

Hibbert, note 2, para 51, quoting Lord Glaisdale in Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v. Lynch,
[1975] A.C. 653.
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NECESSITY

DURESS
OLD
SELF-DEFENCE

Implicit in saying that the other two defences are contained within necessity is the interplay
between statutory and common law defences. Necessity is a purely common law defence, and
therefore is preserved by section 8(3) of the Criminal Code. However, section 8(3) preserves
common law defences “except in so far as they are altered by or are inconsistent with this Act or
any other Act of Parliament”. In effect, then, this diagram shows that the factual circumstances in
which assertions of self-defence or duress are made would, if those defences did not exist, be
dealt with as cases of necessity. Section 8(3) literally prevents this in the case of self-defence and
the statutory version of duress in section 17: an analogous point makes it true for common law
duress. It is recognition of that relationship which has caused the Court to conclude that it would
“be highly anomalous if the common law defence of duress were to be understood as based on
substantially different juridical principles from the common law defence of necessity.”8
In fact, however, that diagram is a slight over-simplification. To really see the relationship
between the three defences, we need to acknowledge a third consideration: the filter.
If a defence is to succeed, then in addition to the trigger and the response, the crime committed
must be an acceptable response to the trigger. What makes a response “acceptable” depends on
the defence. In the case of necessity and duress, a demanding standard is set: the accused’s
response must be “morally involuntary”.9 On the other hand self defence requires only that the
accused’s response be “reasonable”. Moral involuntariness requires that the accused’s will be
8

Hibbert, note 2, para 51.

9

See Perka, note 3, Hibbert, note 2, or R v Ruzic, 2001 SCC 24.
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overborne, that “normal human instincts cry out for action”.10 Reasonableness does not limit the
choices nearly so much: a response can fall within the range of reasonable ones without being, in
essence, the only imaginable one.
This difference in triggers reflects the different characterisation of necessity and duress on the
one hand and self-defence on the other. Necessity and duress are excuses: we do not applaud the
accused’s behaviour, but we do forgive it. Self-defence, in contrast, is a justification: we do not
merely excuse the behaviour, but actually approve of it. As the Court put it in Ryan, “while in a
case of duress we excuse an act that we still consider to be wrong, the impugned act in a case of
self-defence is considered right.”11 It makes sense, therefore, that there are more limited
circumstances (and so a narrower filter) in which we are willing to say “you are not guilty
because your actions were wrong but excusable” than those in which we say “you are not guilty
because you acted rightly”. Again as the Court notes in Ryan “[g]iven the different moral
qualities of the acts involved, it is generally true that the justification of self-defence ought to be
more readily available than the excuse of duress.”12
In that event a more accurate chart would look as follows:
trigger

filter

response

Necessity

an urgent situation of
imminent peril

moral involuntariness

commit some offence

Self-defence

an assault

reasonableness

commit assault

Duress

a threat of death or
bodily harm unless
one commits a
particular offence

moral involuntariness

commit the particular
offence

The effect of that more relaxed trigger for self-defence is that, unlike duress, self-defence is not
entirely contained within necessity. In some cases of self-defence under the old provisions an
accused will have had no choice but to react as he or she did,13 and so the response would have
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Perka, note 3, p. 251.
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Ryan, note 1, para 25.
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Ryan, note 1, para 26.
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That seems to have been the governing theory behind the use of deadly force in s. 34(2), where the accused was
required to believe that “he cannot otherwise preserve himself from death or grievous bodily harm” or in s. 35,
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met the moral involuntariness standard. In other words, in those cases the accused would have
been able to successfully plead the common law defence of necessity had it not been replaced by
statutory self-defence. However, in other cases a response could be reasonable without being
morally involuntary and so, although self-defence is available, necessity would not have
succeeded.
In diagram form, then, the relationship between the three defences would more accurately be
represented in this way:

NECESSITY

DURESS

OLD
SELF-DEFENCE

Part Two: The Evolution of Duress and the Implications of Ryan for Necessity
1) The Evolution of Duress
In order to understand why Ryan has implications for the defence of necessity, it is necessary to
consider the evolution of the defence of duress over the past nearly half-century. The way in
which that defence has changed, and the way in which Ryan solves a long-standing problem, is
interesting in itself as well as being instructive for necessity.

where the accused had to believe that the deadly force was “necessary in order to preserve himself from death or
grievous bodily harm”, for example.
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The most sensible way to understand the development of the law of duress is as a response to an
ill-advised decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1967 in R v Carker.14 Prior to Carker,
one can postulate, we had a single understandable defence of duress which was meant, in limited
but appropriate circumstances, to provide an excuse to a person who was ordered to commit a
crime and threatened for that purpose. Carker undermined that goal, and since shortly after that
decision courts have been working to undo its effect. It took forty-six years but Ryan, in effect,
culminated those efforts.
Carker was a prisoner in an institution. His fellow inmates were engaged in a protest as part of
which they were all destroying the plumbing in their individual cells: cells in which they were
each locked at the time. Carker did not take part until
a substantial body of prisoners, shouting in unison from their separate cells, threatened
the respondent, who was not joining in the disturbance, that if he did not break the
plumbing fixtures in his cell he would be kicked in the head, his arm would be broken
and he would get a knife in the back at the first opportunity.15
Carker attempted to avail himself of the benefit of the statutory defence of duress in section 17 of
the Code, but to no avail. In particular he was found to fall short in two ways. Section 17
provides a defence to a person who is faced with “threats of immediate death or bodily harm
from a person who is present when the offence is committed”. The Supreme Court upheld the
trial judge’s decision that as the threats were of harm later they were not “immediate”, and that
as the other prisoners were in their own cells they were not “present” when Carker committed the
offence. As a result the defence of duress was not available to the accused.
It is not difficult, in retrospect, to see this conclusion as ill-conceived. Perhaps the Court had
concerns about the defence getting out of hand in prison populations if it were allowed to
succeed in this case, or perhaps some other policy concern motivated their decision. If so, that is
not apparent from the decision, which contents itself with adopting a narrow and literal
interpretation of the words “immediate” and “present” and allowing that to dictate the result.
At a policy level this very technical approach does miss the point of the defence of duress. As the
Court has very recently observed in Ryan:

14

R v Carker, [1967] SCR 114.
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Carker, note 14, p 117. Note that he was literally threatened with harm to life and limb.
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the issue is not the immediacy or imminence of the threat, but whether “the accused
failed to avail himself or herself of some opportunity to escape or to render the threat
ineffective”: R. v. Langlois (1993), 80 C.C.C. (3d) 28 (Que. C.A.), at p. 50.16
There seems little question that if the Court had, in 1967, asked itself that question, Carker would
have been acquitted.17 It did not do so, however, and so we were left with that very restrictive
precedent. And as I have said, the history of the law of duress for the past forty-six years has
been an attempt to undo it.
The first maneuvre to avoid the implications of Carker came in Paquette.18 Paquette was forced
to drive two others who planned to commit a robbery, and who in fact killed someone in the
course of that robbery. The accused, along with the other two, was charged with murder. The
evidence showed that the accused had initially refused to drive the others to commit the robbery
and only did so upon being threatened at gun point. He was threatened with “revenge” if he did
not wait, though in fact he drove around the block and tried to prevent the other accused from
getting back into the car when they emerged from the store.
If he were obliged to rely on section 17, it appears that Paquette would have had no defence,
essentially for the reasons that Carker did not. He was threatened with “revenge”, which is future
harm at a later date and therefore not “immediate”. Further, the people who threatened him were
not in his presence when the offence of murder was convicted.
However, the Court rejected the proposition that “the principles of law applicable to the excuse
or defence of duress or compulsion are exhaustively codified in s. 17 of the Criminal Code”.19
Specifically, they found that section 17 referred to a person who “commits” an offence, which
they interpreted to mean the principal offender but not a party. This meant that the common law
defence of duress had not been altered by statute insofar as parties were concerned, and so by
virtue of section 8(3) of the Criminal Code (section 7(3) at the time) it continued to apply. The
Court specifically observed that this meant the result was not determined by Carker.20
As a means of avoiding the unfairness of Carker this is an effective maneuvre. On the other
hand, in the abstract it is not terribly persuasive to claim that section 17 only intended to deal
Ryan, note 1, para 58. Similarly the Court had earlier observed in Ruzic, note 9, para 88 that “s. 17's reliance on
proximity as opposed to reasonable options as the measure of moral choice is problematic”.
16
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At a minimum the questions asked would have been quite different, such as whether protective custody was
available and a reasonable option given the length of the accused’s sentence, and so on.
18

Paquette v The Queen, [1977] 2 SCR 189.
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Paquette, note 18, p 193.

20

Paquette, note 18, p 194.
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with principals, not parties. In the absence of a strong incentive to avoid the statutory provision it
is not a conclusion any court would have been likely to reach. It created the anomalous situation
that two versions of the same defence were now operating in the criminal law, which is not a
model of clarity. This is particularly so when one takes into account that on the very same facts
the Crown might be able to argue for an accused’s guilt either as a principal or as a party.21
Similarly, it is hard to reconcile with the fact that the Crown is permitted to put forward a theory
of the case which allows the jury to accept either of two versions of events, on one of which the
accused is the principal and on the other of which he or she is a party.22 In the absence of a desire
to avoid Carker it would be unnecessary and undesirable complexity.
This lack of clarity is only exacerbated by the fact that, although Paquette confirmed that the
common law defence of duress existed, it did not enumerate the requirements of that defence.
Nor, indeed, did any case soon thereafter set them out fully. The Court did, in Hibbert, conclude
that the common law defence of duress had to be very similar to the common law defence of
necessity, and that it would be incoherent and anomalous to treat it in any other way.23 However,
they only specifically articulated one element of the defence: that the accused must have had no
safe avenue of escape, which was a specific example of the general requirement in necessity that
compliance with the law be demonstrably impossible.24

21

See for example R v Harbottle, [1993] 3 SCR 306 where the accused held the legs of a murder victim while
another person strangled her. The accused might have been a party to the offence by aiding the person who killed
her (as was conceded in the Court of Appeal), or his actions might themselves have been a cause of her death and he
therefore was a principal offender.
See for example R v Thatcher, [1987] 1 SCR 652 where the Crown’s theory in a murder case was that the accused
had either shot his wife or had hired someone to shoot his wife, but in either instance was guilty of murder.
22
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Hibbert, note 2, para 54:
As I noted earlier, the common law defences of necessity and duress apply to essentially similar factual
situations. Indeed, to repeat Lord Simon of Glaisdale's observation, "[d]uress is...merely a particular
application of the doctrine of "necessity"". In my view, the similarities between the two defences are so
great that consistency and logic requires that they be understood as based on the same juristic principles.
Indeed, to do otherwise would be to promote incoherence and anomaly in the criminal law.

24

Hibbert, note 2, para 55. Hibbert also reversed a finding in Paquette, note 18, which is relevant to duress, but is
not actually one of the elements of the defence. Paquette had held that a person who only cooperates in the
commission of an offence does not have the mens rea for party liability under s. 21(2). In fact that conclusion would
make it unnecessary to resort to the defence of duress in the first place. In Hibbert the Court reversed that
conclusion, holding that a person cooperating only under threat of force does have the mens rea for party liability
(under either s. 21(1)(b) or s. 21(2)). In other words only a successful defence of duress could save such a person
from conviction.
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Paquette had given up some clarity in the law in order to achieve some greater fairness. The next
significant step in the law of duress, the decision in Ruzic, took that same step further, buying
more fairness at the cost of even greater uncertainty. Ruzic was a citizen of the former
Yugoslavia at just the point in history when it was becoming “the former Yugoslavia”. As a
result of credible threats directed against her and her mother (who remained behind) she
smuggled drugs into Canada. Unlike Paquette she was the principal offender and so was forced
to use section 17. Like Carker the threats to her were of future harm and made by someone not
present at the time she committed the offence. The Court had to either convict her or find a new
way around the rigours of Carker: they opted for the second choice, making use of the Charter to
do so.
In essence, Ruzic combined the results in two previous cases to find a Charter violation in this
one. Previously in Daviault the Court had reached the conclusion that it was a principle of
fundamental justice than an accused could not be convicted based on physically involuntary
behaviour.25 In Perka, in fully establishing the defence of necessity, the Court had found that that
defence was based on the notion of “moral involuntariness”, which was meant to be closely
analogous to physical involuntariness. In Ruzic, then, they raised that second principle to the
status of a principle of fundamental justice, concluding that an accused could not be convicted
based on morally involuntary behaviour.26 Since section 17 permitted conviction on that basis, it
created a section 7 violation which could not be saved by section 1.
However – and this is the point which meant that Ruzic created confusion - the Court did not find
that section 17 as a whole should be struck down. The only question in issue before them was
whether an accused’s behaviour could be morally involuntary due to threats, despite the fact that
the threat was not one of immediate harm and the threatener was not present. As the answer to
that question was “yes”, the specific things which violated section 7 were only the immediacy
and presence requirements. The Court, therefore, did not strike down the entire section, but only
those particular portions of the statutory provision.
That did not mean that nothing was left in their place: rather it meant that the common law
equivalent to those requirements re-arose in their place. In part that meant that the “safe avenue
of escape” rule articulated in Hibbert now applied, in essence as a replacement for the fact that
the threatener was present. In addition the Court in Ruzic elaborated on another aspect of the
common law rule: the immediacy requirement. After considering the common law on duress in
25

R v Daviault, [1994] 3 SCR 63.

26

The Court rejected the argument which had succeeded in the Ontario Court of Appeal, that an accused like Ruzic
would not be morally blameworthy. In part because of Hibbert’s reversal of Paquette on the question of whether
mens rea was proven, the Court concluded that an accused acting under duress was blameworthy. The point, as
established by the distinction discussed at length in Perka, was that such a person’s actions should be excused, not
justified.
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Canada, England, Australia and the United States the Court concluded that the common law did
not impose the strict “immediacy” requirement of section 17, though it did impose a similar but
slightly less rigid rule: the “strict temporal connection” requirement.
Post-Ruzic, then it was fair to say that the state of the law around duress was in a significant state
of confusion. Two versions of the defence existed, for pragmatic rather than principled reasons.
The statutory version had been struck down in part but remained in part, and the common law
version had never been fully articulated. This was the problem that the court set about to remedy
with its decision in Ryan. It did so admirably.
Strictly speaking, the facts and legal issue in Ryan did not require the Court to do anything about
this confusion. The accused was a battered spouse who had attempted to hire a hitman to kill her
abusive husband from whom she was separated.27 The lower courts had found that the accused
could not rely on self-defence, but decided that the statutory defence of duress could be extended
to the accused’s circumstances, since she had committed the offence in response to threats. The
Supreme Court of Canada very sensibly rejected this argument, which had misconceived the
purpose of the distinct role the defence of duress is meant to play. They concluded:
As we see it, the defence of duress is available when a person commits an offence while
under compulsion of a threat made for the purpose of compelling him or her to commit it.
That was not Ms. Ryan’s situation. She wanted her husband dead because he was
threatening to kill her and her daughter, not because she was being threatened for the
purpose of compelling her to have him killed. That being the case, the defence of duress
was not available to her, no matter how compelling her situation was viewed in a broader
perspective.28
I have observed elsewhere that the Court’s decision could, in essence, have stopped at that
point.29 However, they went on not only to explain that conclusion (and controversially direct a
stay of proceedings) but also to “bring more clarity to the law of duress” because:
[t]he patchwork quilt nature of the present law has given rise to significant uncertainty
about the parameters of both the statutory and common law elements of the defence and
the relationship between them.30
27

These are the facts accepted at trial. There is controversy over whether this is an accurate depiction of the
relationship between the accused and her husband, but that dispute is not important to the general development of
the law of duress. For discussion of those aspects of the Ryan decision, see Archie Kaiser, “Ryan: A Troubling and
Doctrinally Meandering Case Sets the Stage for the Law Reform Process and an Independent Inquiry” (2013) 98 CR
(6th) 261.
28

Ryan, note 1, para 2.

29

Steve Coughlan, “R. v. Ryan: Annotation” (2013) 98 CR (6th) 252.
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First, the Court noted that post-Ruzic four aspects of section 17 remained in place:
1. there must be a threat of death or bodily harm directed against the accused or a third
party;
2. the accused must believe that the threat will be carried out;
3. the offence must not be on the list of excluded offences; and
4. the accused cannot be a party to a conspiracy or criminal association such that the
person is subject to compulsion.31
In addition, Ruzic had made clear that two aspects of the common law defence –the safe avenue
of escape test and a close temporal connection – had to be added to the statutory test.
Interestingly, however, Ryan describes Ruzic as having added three things: “(1) no safe avenue
of escape; (2) a close temporal connection; and (3) proportionality”.32
One could be excused for not having seen Ruzic as reading proportionality into statutory duress.
There is brief passing reference to it as a consideration in the common law version of the
defence, but little elaboration on it.33 In considering whether the trial judge had properly
instructed the jury at Ruzic’s trial, the Court noted only that he had properly described the safe
avenue of escape and immediacy requirements, and further pointed only to those two elements as
matters which trial judges in future should include in their charges.34
Whether this point was clear in Ruzic or not, however, is not important. What matters is that it is
now clear that proportionality is part of the statutory defence. Even more important is the reason
that this is so. That is, Ryan clarifies a point which had been ambiguous in previous discussions
30

Ryan, note 1, para 3.

31

Ryan, note 1, para 43.

32

Ryan, note 1, para 46.

As Kent Roach observes, the Court “hinted that that may be a requirement of proportionality”: Criminal Law (5th
ed) (Irwin Law 2012) at p. 373.
33

34

Ruzic, note 9:
[96] In the future, when the common law defence of duress is raised, the trial judge should instruct the jury
clearly on the components of this defence including the need for a close temporal connection between the
threat and the harm threatened. The jury’s attention should also be drawn to the need for the application of
an objective-subjective assessment of the safe avenue of escape test.

The Court in this part of its decision focuses on charges around the common law defence as a whole, not on s. 17,
because the trial judge had concluded s. 17 should be struck down in its entirety.
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of both duress and necessity: that proportionality is not a requirement in addition to moral
involuntariness, but is an aspect of moral involuntariness.
The Court’s primary discussions of moral involuntariness prior to Ruzic and Ryan had come in
cases about the defence of necessity, which will be considered at greater length in a moment. For
now it need simply be observed that that defence has been described as having three elements: an
urgent situation of imminent peril, no reasonable legal alternative, and proportionality between
the harm inflicted and the harm avoided. Many commentators took the Court, in formulating the
defence in this way, to be saying that “moral involuntariness” was captured by the first two
elements and that proportionality was a further requirement in addition to moral involuntariness.
Although that was taken to be what the Court meant, commentators did not generally see this as
a sensible approach. Trotter, for example, argued:
Proportionality is somewhat out of place in the conceptualization of necessity as an
excuse because it speaks more to considerations of justification, rather than excuse. As
the Latimer Court said, it involves an evaluation of society's values as to what is
appropriate and what represents a transgression, and alludes to a comparison of the harm
inflicted and the harm avoided. This language is perilously close to the “lesser of two
evils” conceptualization of necessity, which the Court had previously rejected in Perka.
More perplexing is that the Latimer Court has given proportionality pre-eminent status by
recommending that, where it is apparent that the accused's acts are disproportionate, it is
preferable for the judge to rule out necessity without considering the other parts of the
necessity test.35 (footnotes omitted)
This problem is exacerbated by the conclusion in Latimer that the first two elements of the
defence are to be assessed on a modified objective standard (that is, by how the situation would
appear to a reasonable person with the relevant characteristics of the accused) but that
proportionality was to be measured on a purely objective standard which took no characteristics
of the accused into account. The court’s rationale for this difference in Latimer was that the
proportionality requirement is “fundamentally a determination reflecting society’s values as to
what is appropriate and what represents a transgression.”36

Gary T. Trotter, “Necessity and Death: Lessons from Latimer and the Case of the Conjoined Twins” (2003) 40
Alta. L. Rev. 817 – 840, pp 821-22. To similar effect see Benjamin L. Berger, “Emotions and the Veil of
Voluntarism: The Loss of Judgment in Canadian Criminal Defences” (2006) 51 McGill L.J. 99 – 128, p 109: “If fear
overwhelms Mary's will, no matter how unreasonably, on the voluntarist account it ought not to matter that the result
is disproportionate.”
35

36

R v Latimer, 2001 SCC 1 para 34.
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This difference in approach between the elements seemed also to drive a wedge between them.
As Sinel pointed out:
because moral involuntariness does not speak to proportionality, only to reasonableness,
several unpalatable consequences arise. Arguing from a reasonableness criterion, we
would say that a reasonable person in the “clothes” of the accused would have acted in a
similar fashion. Proportionality, on the other hand, is objectively measured: the act
committed under duress must be proportionate to the threat the accused was under.37
The problem with separating proportionality from moral involuntariness became even more
acute when Ruzic, decided a few months after Latimer, raised “moral involuntariness” to the
status of a principle of fundamental justice. Given that conclusion, it would violate section 7 of
the Charter to impose any additional requirements beyond moral involuntariness itself. In that
event a proportionality requirement would have to be struck down if it were an additional
requirement.38
Ryan, however, makes it unambiguous that proportionality is not to be seen as an additional
requirement, but instead that “[p]roportionality is inherent in the principle of moral
involuntariness”.39 They explain:
only an action based on a proportionally grave threat, resisted with normal fortitude, can
be considered morally involuntary.40
Or elsewhere:
the “moral voluntariness” of an act must depend on whether it is proportional to the
threatened harm. To determine if the proportionality requirement is met, two elements
must be considered: the difference between the nature and magnitude of the harm
threatened and the offence committed, as well as a general moral judgment regarding the
accused’s behaviour in the circumstances.41
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In Ryan, then, it is established that proportionality is not, as most commentators had assumed, a
utilitarian balancing of harms.42 Rather it is itself a moral judgement about how much harm we
expect a person to suffer rather than succumb to the temptation to pass that harm along to
another.
With regard to necessity this means that the three requirements of that defence jointly capture
moral involuntariness. With regard to duress, it means that, since proportionality is a part of
moral involuntariness – and since Ruzic was incorporating the requirements of moral
involuntariness into the statutory defence – section 17 now includes a proportionality
requirement.
The incorporation of moral involuntariness into section 17 also had one final effect on the
statutory provision. The second requirement in section 17 was that the accused believes that the
threat will be carried out: although the statute sets out a subjective standard, the Court concludes,
it must actually be an objective one.
In part the Court justifies this as simply better policy: the subjective standard, which is
favourable to an accused, made sense to moderate the very strict requirement of Carker with
regard to immediacy and presence. Once that immediacy requirement was relaxed, however, the
subjective standard had to be “tightened up” to an objective one. More importantly, the Court
held, moral involuntariness required no less:
Considering that society’s opinion of the accused’s actions is an important aspect of the
principle, it would be contrary to the very idea of moral involuntariness to simply accept
the accused’s subjective belief without requiring that certain external factors be present.43
Ultimately, then, the Court articulates a statutory defence of duress incorporating seven
elements:
1. a threat of death or bodily harm directed against the accused or a third party;
2. a reasonable belief that the threat will be carried out;
3. no safe avenue of escape;
4. a close temporal connection;
5. proportionality;

See the earlier articles, or also Paul Guy, “R. v. Latimer and the Defence of Necessity: One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back” (2003), 66 Sask. L. Rev. 485 – 510 at para 43.
42
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Ryan, note 1, para 52.
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6. the accused is not a part of a conspiracy or criminal association such that the person is
subject to compulsion, and;
7. the offence is not on the list of excluded offences.
The Court then turned its attention to articulating the common law defence of duress. Given that
the heavy lifting had already been done with the statutory defence, this task was relatively easy.
Much of the statutory defence had been established by fully explaining the aspects of the
common law duress which were being imported into it. The result is that the first five elements
of the common law defence simply are the first five elements of the statutory version.
The Court then considers the sixth statutory requirement, that the accused is not a member of a
conspiracy subjecting him or her to compulsion. They note that some courts have incorporated
this element into the common law defence. More importantly, they find that the inclusion of this
requirement is an aspect of the defence which is, like the others, dictated by moral
involuntariness :
An accused that, because of his or her criminal involvement, knew coercion or threats
were a possibility cannot claim that there was no safe avenue of escape, nor can he or she
truly be found to have committed the resulting offence in a morally involuntary manner.44
Accordingly, the common law defence of duress is completed by the inclusion of that element.
That is, the common law defence of duress is fully described by the first six of the seven
elements making up the statutory version.
By these mutual adjustments to the statutory and common law versions of duress, the Court
managed to turn them into essentially identical defences. Further, that defence does not
incorporate the unreasonably strict immediacy and presence standard of Carker. Although it took
forty-six years, we were for almost all purposes back to the pre-Carker situation: a single
understandable defence of duress which was meant, in limited but appropriate circumstances, to
provide an excuse to a person who was ordered to commit a crime and threatened for that
purpose.
The Court says that two differences remain, though realistically it should only be considered to
be one:
The first is that, as was established in Paquette and confirmed in Ruzic, the statutory
defence applies to principals, while the common law defence is available to parties to an
offence. The second is that the statutory version of the defence has a lengthy list of
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exclusions, whereas it is unclear in the Canadian common law of duress whether any
offences are excluded.45
I say that these two differences should be regarded as one, since it is only the statutory list of
exclusions which matters. If that were gone, the statutory and common law defences would be
identical, and it would be of no consequence whatsoever that principals relied on one and parties
the other.
There is, in fact, every reason to think that the list will go. The issue did not arise on the facts of
either Ruzic or Ryan and so did not need to be decided there. However, it seems pretty clear that
the Ruzic moral involuntariness argument, understood to incorporate proportionality in the way
that Ryan dictates, leaves no room for the list.
First, it seems obvious that there are circumstances in which an accused could commit an offence
which is on the list – robbery, for example46 - as a result of a threat of death which a reasonable
person would believe, where there is a close temporal connection and no safe avenue of escape,
and where society would not expect the person to suffer death rather than commit the offence. If
that is so, then the accused’s behaviour would count as morally involuntary. Since it is the
presence of that offence on the list of exclusions which would deny the accused the defence, and
therefore call for a conviction which violated section 7, that aspect of the list would have to be
struck down.
Second, in cases where denying the defence will not amount to convicting a person for morally
involuntary behaviour, the list is not necessary to achieve that result. There is an unresolved
dispute, for example, over whether duress could ever be successfully pleaded as a defence to a
charge of murder.47 The important point to recognise in this context is that even if duress should
be excluded as a defence to murder (or sexual assault, or high treason), the statutory list of
exclusions is irrelevant to that discussion. The dispute is currently being argued in the context of
the common law defence, to which the list of exclusions does not apply. And the essence of the
reasoning over this issue really amounts to questioning whether we would expect the accused to
suffer the harm threatened rather than commit the offence demanded: in other words, whether the
accused’s behaviour is proportional, and therefore whether it is morally involuntary.
Really, the statutory list of exclusions is already meant to be a proportionality requirement,
though a rough and ready one – “it is never proportional to commit this offence” is in essence
45
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what the inclusion of any given offence on the list means.48 But the result in Ryan has now
explicitly incorporated a more sophisticated proportionality analysis into the statutory defence.
There is no reason to do the same thing twice.
Once proportionality is understood to be an aspect of moral involuntariness, then the offences on
the list can be divided into two groups: those whose inclusion violates section 7, and those whose
inclusion is redundant.49 For every offence on the list, it will either be the case that committing
the offence was proportional – in which case denying the defence will violate the Charter based
on moral involuntariness – or that committing the offence was not proportional – in which case
the defence has failed before the list is reached.
There seems little reason to doubt, then, that the list of exclusion which serves as the only
distinction between statutory and common law duress will eventually disappear, and therefore
that clarity in the law of duress will have been fully restored.50
2) The Implications of Ryan for Necessity
We shall now turn to discuss the impact of the decision in Ryan on the defence of necessity. It
was noted above that duress is simply a special case of necessity, and therefore at a policy level
one would expect the defences to proceed along the same lines, or at a minimum that any
differences would have a sufficient justification. In fact, there is more to it than just that.
Post-Ryan the contours of duress (both statutory and common law) are almost entirely dictated
by the Charter. In section 17 this was the basis for replacing the strict immediacy and presence
requirements, for changing the subjective standard to an objective one in section 17, for
explicitly including proportionality, and eventually is likely to be the basis for removing the list
of exclusions. In the common law version the Charter principle of moral involuntariness dictates
literally everything but the fact that, in step one, the trigger is a threat of death or bodily harm
made for the purpose of compelling an accused to commit a crime, rather than some other sort of
threat. And even with regard to that step the Court observed:
48
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Although, traditionally, the degree of bodily harm was characterized as “grievous”, the
issue of severity is better dealt with at the proportionality stage, which acts as the
threshold for the appropriate degree of bodily harm.51
Since proportionality is an aspect of moral involuntariness, even the nature of the threat is in part
dictated by that requirement.
As I have observed above, broadly the defences of necessity and duress follow the same
structure: a trigger, a filter, and a response. Both share the same filter, moral involuntariness, and
the efforts of the Court in Ryan, building on Ruzic, were to explain the effects of moral
involuntariness on duress. In essence, then, the law of duress is now what it must be. But since
virtually all of those elements are dictated by a principle of fundamental justice which governs
both duress and necessity, it might not simply be good policy to adjust the latter to conform to
the former: it is likely a matter of constitutional necessity.
We have already observed how the Court articulated the defence of necessity in Latimer:
1. urgent situation of imminent peril
2. no reasonable legal alternative
3. proportionality.
This formulation of necessity is much shorter than the newly-articulated common law defence of
duress, which has six elements. That is already a bit surprising, since duress is understood to be a
special case of necessity.
In fact I want to argue that this formulation of the defence is incomplete even on the existing
necessity case law. Further, I will argue that the decision in Ryan necessitates some further
changes.
To begin, note that the defence of necessity was firmly established by the Court in Perka. In that
case the accused were in international waters, with a shipload of marijuana which they were
taking from California to Alaska, when bad weather combined with various mechanical
problems led them to come to shore in British Columbia. The Crown argued that as a matter of
policy the accused should not be able to plead necessity because they were engaged in illegal
activity at the time their emergency arose.
The Court rejected that argument for two reasons. First (and less importantly) the Court observed
that being in international waters while intending to smuggle drugs into the United States was
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not actually illegal under Canadian law. More importantly, they rejected the argument that
illegality at the time the emergency arose was automatically a bar to claiming the defence.
However, this issue led the Court to observe that there was a somewhat-analogous bar to
claiming necessity: in essence, that an accused cannot create his or her own emergency:
If the necessitous situation was clearly foreseeable to a reasonable observer, if the actor
contemplated or ought to have contemplated that his actions would likely give rise to an
emergency requiring the breaking of the law, then I doubt whether what confronted the
accused was in the relevant sense an emergency. His response was in that sense not
“involuntary”.52
The Court is very clear in Perka that this is a prerequisite to successfully pleading the defence of
necessity. In fact, it ought to be explicitly recognized as a fourth requirement: really when
Latimer described the defence of necessity established in Perka it ought to have said that it was:
1. urgent situation of imminent peril
2. no reasonable legal alternative
3. proportionality
4. the accused did not create the urgent situation.
An accused who does create the emergency will not ultimately succeed in the defence. For that
matter, if there is an air of reality to the first three elements but no air of reality to the fourth, the
defence ought not to go to a jury. However, on the current formulation of the defence the air of
reality test would have been passed, which is clearly an inappropriate result. A better description
of the current law is this four part articulation.
Note, of course, that this amounts to incorporating into necessity (the general case defence) a
general case version of the specific requirement in duress that “the accused is not a part of a
conspiracy or criminal association such that the person is subject to compulsion”. In Perka the
Court specifically observed that this requirement was the equivalent of that portion of section
17.53 Further, the rationale offered in Perka – that an accused who has chosen to create a risk
cannot later claim to have acted involuntarily because of that risk – is exactly the rationale
offered in Ryan for incorporating the “no conspiracy” rule into common law duress. Both rules
amount to “you can’t create your own compulsion”, whether that compulsion is by circumstances
or by threats.
52
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There is a further way in which the formulations of necessity and duress should be brought more
into line, which also does not require any change to the existing law. This relates to the mental
aspects of the defences. That is to say, does the accused subjectively have to believe that the
particular state of affairs is true, or is it necessary that a reasonable person would believe it? Or
(as is more commonly the case) is the test a modified objective one which “takes into account the
particular circumstances and human frailties of the accused”?54
In fact the Court often talks about the mental aspects of defences, but does not routinely list them
when enumerating the requirements of a defence.
In Latimer, for example, the Court stated that the first two elements of necessity should be
judged on a modified objective test while the third should be based on a purely objective test.
Nonetheless, it does not list these requirements when enumerating the elements of the defence.
Similarly most of the mental aspects of duress have been discussed but tend not to be listed. In
Hibbert the Court spent some time discussing the mental state appropriate for judging the “safe
avenue of escape” requirement, eventually rejecting both subjective and purely objective
standards and adopting the modified objective standard.55 In Ryan the Court considers the mental
state – the type of belief - which should accompany three elements: the threat, proportionality
and participation in a conspiracy. The Court concludes that the mental elements are modified
objective, modified objective and subjective, respectively. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly
neither Ruzic nor Ryan explicitly discuss the type of belief which must accompany the “strict
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temporal connection”, though it seems likely that it should, like the safe avenue of escape, be
judged on a modified objective test.56
Of these mental aspects of the defence of duress, only one is specifically enumerated when the
Court sets out the two versions of the defence of duress in Ryan: that “the accused must
reasonably believe that the threat will be carried out”.57 The reason it is explicitly included is
because it is an element which was being changed in the statutory version: section 17 created a
subjective standard but the Court concluded that the proportionality requirement dictated that a
modified objective standard must be used instead. It was therefore necessary to explicitly make
that observation, and that is now the requirement for both the statutory and common law
versions.
If we are comparing duress and necessity, therefore, it is worth noting that the modified objective
standard is precisely the same standard which the Court had already found to apply to the
corresponding element in necessity.58 Writing the defence in a way which makes more apparent
the existing parallels, then, we could say that necessity is:
1. urgent situation of imminent peril
2. a reasonable belief that that situation exists
3. no reasonable legal alternative
4. proportionality
5. the accused did not create the urgent situation.
All of this so far is simply explaining the parallels which already exist. Indeed, a further parallel
exists in that the equivalent elements of “no safe avenue of escape” and “no reasonable legal
alternative” have both been decided to be judged on a modified objective standard. Necessity and
duress are very similar not only in their general approach, as discussed in Part One, but in their
specific requirements.
Ryan, note 1, notes at para 68 that “[t]he first purpose of the close temporal connection element is to ensure that
there truly was no safe avenue of escape for the accused.”
56
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In fact, there are only three dissimilarities between the two defences. First, although duress has
the separate element of a “close temporal connection”, that consideration is folded into “urgent
situation of imminent peril” in necessity. Second, proportionality is based on a modified
objective standard in duress but on a purely objective standard in necessity.59 Thirdly, “not part
of a conspiracy” is said in Ryan to be based on a subjective standard, but “did not create the
urgent situation” was said in Perka to be an objective test.
My argument is that in the case of all three of these differences, the result for duress was dictated
by the moral involuntariness requirement: in other words, to do differently would have violated
the Charter. Therefore, in each of these three cases, I argue, the defence of necessity should be
amended to conform.
Let us first consider necessity’s requirement of “urgent situation of imminent peril”. That is the
way in which the first requirement was framed in Latimer: that is, as a single requirement.60 It is
less clear that Perka intended those two issues to be a single consideration, since it refers to
“[t]he requirement that the situation be urgent and the peril be imminent” (emphasis added).61 I
argue that it is better to treat whether the peril is imminent as a separate question from whether
the situation is urgent. Indeed, it seems that the Charter demands that approach, because the
imminence requirement is a questionable one.
Both Perka and Latimer, in articulating necessity, pre-date Ruzic, and the central issue in Ruzic
was whether behaviour could only be morally involuntary if the threat was imminent. The
answer, of course, was no: threats of future harm could also cause a person’s behaviour to be
morally involuntary. On the facts of Ruzic, the Court noted that the threat to the accused’s
mother could only be given effect if the person who was to meet her discovered that she did not
arrived, got in contact with the conspirator in Belgrade, and that conspirator then went to the
location where the accused’s mother was to be found: nonetheless the threat, though not
imminent, made her behaviour morally involuntary.
That argument should remain true whether the threats arise from another person, as with duress,
or from circumstances, as with necessity. The real question is not whether the harm will occur
immediately, but whether “it was realistically unavoidable.”62 No doubt as a general proposition
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results will be more difficult to avoid the more imminent they are, but that is only a general
proposition, not an absolute requirement.63
By way of analogy, consider the Court’s hypothetical in Lavallee, that a person taken hostage
and told she will be killed in three days time could reasonably kill her captor in self-defence if
the opportunity arose on the first day.64 The very point of their analogy is to show that
imminence, despite being generally a good indicator that the defence should succeed, was not a
requirement of that defence.
The situation should be no different for a person who is in danger due to natural events rather
than human intervention. Horder, for example, proposes the example of a group of people
exploring a cave – “pot-holers”, as he refers to them – who become trapped when the fattest of
their group becomes stuck in the only exit. If rising waters threaten to drown them all eventually,
should they have the defence of necessity if they use dynamite to blast the exit wider, killing the
fat pot-holer in the process?65 It is not necessary to settle that question to see that (just as in the
Lavallee hypothetical) circumstances could become urgent (because death is inevitable through
drowning with no possible hope of rescue) before the peril becomes imminent (because the
waters will not reach the roof for three days). The certainty of death in three days time could
make action on the first day not only reasonable but also morally involuntary.66
Just as in Ruzic, this does not mean that imminence is completely irrelevant to necessity. Clearly,
the more immediate a threat, the more likely it is that a person’s response to it will properly be
seen as morally involuntary. But that should not make a strict imminence requirement a sine qua

63

In Perka itself the Court described the “imminence” requirement in this way:
until the time comes when the threatened harm is immediate, there are generally options open to the
defendant to avoid the harm, other than the option of disobeying the literal terms of the law. (emphasis
added)

Perka, note 3, p 251, quoting LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (1972), at p 388. My argument simply amounts to not
ignoring the word “generally” in that sentence.
64

Lavallee, note 55, p 889.

Jeremy Horder, “Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship” (1998) 11 Can. J.L. &
Juris. 143-165.
65

66

Consider as well the circumstances of Aron Ralston, a climber who amputated his own arm as the only method of
escape after becoming trapped by a rock in an isolated location. The title of the movie recounting his circumstances
– 127 Hours – is an indication of how long he waited until responding to his urgent circumstances. Had he waited
until his death was actually imminent, however, he certainly would not have survived. No necessity claim arises, of
course, but the example shows the distinction between “urgent” and “imminent”.

24

non for necessity any more than, at common law, it was for duress. As the Court concluded in
Ruzic:
A requirement that the threat be “imminent” has been interpreted and applied in a more
flexible manner.67
A more sensible interpretation of necessity would not make “urgent situation of imminent peril”
a single element: it would treat “urgent situation” as one requirement, and incorporate a slightly
relaxed “strict temporal connection” requirement as a separate step. Indeed, since this was found
to be demanded by the principle of moral involuntariness in Ruzic and Ryan, this step is probably
mandatory, not simply better policy.
It is not that the Court was unaware of this difference between the two defences: they note in
Ryan that “[t]he strict immediacy or imminence requirement found in the defence of necessity
was not imported into the common law defence of duress.”68 However, they engage in no
analysis of whether the necessity standard remains constitutional. I argue it is clear that it does
not.
On the other hand, the Court is aware of and in Ryan in effect re-affirms the second difference,
the use of a purely objective assessment of proportionality in necessity but a modified objective
standard for that same element in duress. They hold:
The evaluation of the proportionality requirement on a modified objective standard
differs from the standard used in the defence of necessity, which is purely objective.
While the defences of duress and necessity share the same juristic principles, according to
Lamer C.J. in Hibbert, this does not entail that they must employ the same standard when
evaluating proportionality. The Court in Ruzic noted that the two defences, although both
categorized as excuses rooted in the notion of moral or normative involuntariness, target
different types of situations. Furthermore, the temporality requirement for necessity is
one of imminence, whereas the threat in a case of duress can be carried out in the future.
It is therefore not so anomalous that the courts have attributed differing tests for
proportionality, especially when we consider that the defences may apply under
noticeably different factual circumstances.69
The Court says that the two defences need not employ the same standard when evaluating
proportionality, which would certainly be true if that standard were simply a matter of positive
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law. In fact, though, it is section 7 of the Charter which has dictated the result for duress.
Proportionality is an aspect of moral involuntariness and the Court observed in Ryan both that:
the “moral voluntariness” of an act must depend on whether it is proportional to the
threatened harm70
and that:
[g]iven that the defence of duress “evolved from attempts at striking a proper balance
between those conflicting interests of the accused, of the victims and of society” (Ruzic,
at para. 60), proportionality measured on a modified objective standard is key.71
It is hard to see how this leaves room for a different standard for proportionality in necessity.
Further, the two rationales offered by the Court for the difference are unpersuasive. First, they
say, the defences target different types of situations. This is true in a sense, of course –
everything is different some way – but it is not true in a relevant way. Duress and necessity are
not different in the sense that subjective and objective fault are different, that is, as true
alternatives to one another. As the Court has noted, and as was discussed at length in Part One,
duress is only a special case of necessity. If the defence of duress did not exist, necessity would
in fact apply to those situations, by virtue of section 8(3) of the Code. In that event it is hard to
see how the “types of situations” could be different in a meaningful way.
The Court’s second rationale for the different standards is that duress allows for future threats,
while necessity requires imminence. As I have just argued that the imminence requirement in
necessity must, as a result of the Court’s own section 7 argument, be adjusted to allow for future
threats, it will be apparent why I suggest that that rationale is also not persuasive.
Finally on this point, note that assessing proportionality by means of society’s standard, the
purely objective one, while “urgent situation” and “no reasonable legal alternative” were
assessed on a modified objective standard, made sense when it seemed as though proportionality
was an additional requirement meant to provide a check on the moral involuntariness claim. Now
that Ryan has made clear that all of those elements are part of moral involuntariness, it is difficult
to see how one would judge some aspects on one standard and some on the other.
Accordingly, I suggest that this aspect of necessity ought also, based on Ryan, to be brought into
line with duress.
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Finally we come to the standard for the “no creating one’s own compulsion” requirement in the
two defences. Although the Court has set out different standards for the two defences –
subjective for duress but objective for necessity – it is not clear that they are actually committed
to this view. In Perka, when discussing the “create your own emergency” criterion, the Court
speaks of it in objective terms, but never explicitly discusses whether an objective or subjective
standard is the appropriate one. In Ryan, on the other hand, the Court engages directly in an
analysis of the competing arguments for the two standards and concludes that “the subjective
standard is more in line with the principle of moral involuntariness”.72 Considering that the Court
only really analysed the issue in one of the two cases, and that that analysis reaches a conclusion
based upon what the Charter dictates, the case for the same standard applying to both is
compelling.73
A more accurate full articulation of the defence of necessity post-Ryan, therefore, would
incorporate requirements the Court has already included in the defence, and would make changes
based on the now more fully understood demands of the moral involuntariness requirement. It
would, accordingly, be as follows:
1. urgent situation
2. a reasonable belief that that situation exists
3. no reasonable legal alternative
4. close temporal connection
5. proportionality
6. the accused did not create the urgent situation.
The modified objective standard would apply to all elements but the sixth, which would be
judged based on the accused’s subjective belief.
In essence, this formulation of necessity amounts to concluding that the decision in Ryan is a
very good one, and that we ought to do more of what it says. In particular we ought to do it with
regard to the defence of necessity, because of the second major issue to be discussed in this
paper: the possible demise of duress. As I observed above, there is a good argument that duress
has been clarified just in time to be rendered redundant by legislative changes to self-defence.
Part Three: Duress and Self-defence.
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Especially, of course, as Perka is a pre-Charter case, and as Latimer never considered the standard for this
consideration since it had not been listed as an element of the defence.
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In Part One I represented both in chart form and diagrammatically the relationship between
necessity, duress and self-defence. As the Venn diagram showed, duress was entirely contained
within necessity, which was significant to the argument in Part Two. However, that discussion in
Part One was based on the recently-repealed sections 34-37 of the Criminal Code. In this part, I
will turn to discuss the significance of the newly-enacted section 34 of the Code, which is
applicable in a broader range of circumstances. In particular I will argue that the statutory
defence of self-defence has now been broadened so that it encompasses all of the situations
which would otherwise fall within duress. Since self-defence is a statutory defence and statutes
take priority over the common law, this means that it must act to exclude at least the common
law defence of duress.
Ironically, then, the legislative action which bracketed Ryan (since the provision was passed
before that decision but proclaimed after) precludes common law duress for reasons which are
explained in Ryan itself. Before turning to that explanation, however, let us consider the new
self-defence provision in its own right.
I argued in Part One that each of necessity, duress and self-defence consist of a trigger, a
response and a filter. That is, in fact, exactly how the new section 34(1) is structured. It reads:
34. (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if
(a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or
another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person;
(b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or
protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and
(c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances.
The trigger, then, is the use or threat of force. The response is committing some act which
constitutes an offence. The filter is reasonableness.
The filter of reasonableness is, for the most part, unchanged from the previous version of selfdefence. Section 34(2) lists a number of factors which “shall” be considered, many of which
seem to have been specifically adopted from previous case law. For example, section 34(2)(e)
and (f) call for consideration of:
(e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident;
(f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the incident,
including any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force or threat.
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These factors seem to be adopted straight from the reasoning in Lavallee.74 Other factors raise
considerations which are quite familiar to us from the preceding discussion, such as:
(b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other
means available to respond to the potential use of force
or
(g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force.
For that matter, the fact that section 34(1)(a) explicitly sets a reasonableness standard while
section 34(2)(e) and (f) incorporate personal characteristics seems to make clear that this defence
is to be assessed on a modified objective standard.
No doubt there will be some teething pains in working out precisely how to use the new section:
is the reference in section 34(2)(c) to “the person’s role in the incident” meant to capture the
former section 34/section 35 distinction between those who face unprovoked assaults versus
those who are initial aggressors, for example? On the whole, however, it does not seem as
though the “reasonableness” issue, and therefore the filter in self-defence, is radically changed.75
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The complete list is:
(2) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the court shall consider
the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties and the act, including, but not limited to, the
following factors:
(a) the nature of the force or threat;
(b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other means
available to respond to the potential use of force;
(c) the person’s role in the incident;
(d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon;
(e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident;
(f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the incident,
including any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force or threat;
(f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the incident;
(g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force; and
(h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was
lawful.
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It is also not likely that the trigger is broader, although at first glance it might seem so. The new
provision allows an accused to respond not only to “force” but also to a “threat of force”,
whereas the previous sections 34 and 35 used to provide that the defence only kicked in if the
accused was “assaulted”. However, the old provisions were triggered more easily than that
wording might immediately suggest. First, section 37 broadened self-defence to include
preventing an assault, not merely responding to one. Further, under section 265(1)(b) an assault
includes the behaviour of a person who:
attempts or threatens, by an act or a gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or
causes that other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to
effect his purpose.
That too allowed for self-defence by someone who was threatened rather actually assaulted.
Most importantly, in Lavallee the Court specifically rejected the requirement that an assault must
always be imminent before self-defence could be argued, finding that that accused’s claim could
be based on the victim’s “threat to kill her when everyone else had gone.”76 Accordingly,
although the new section 34 explicitly mentions “a threat of force” in a way the old provisions
did not, in fact the trigger might be no broader than it was before.77
However, it is no longer true that, as the Supreme Court said in Ryan, that “self-defence is based
on the principle that it is lawful, in defined circumstances, to meet force (or threats of force) with
force”.78
Although the trigger and filter are essentially unchanged, it is very clear that the response covers
a much wider ground under the new self-defence provision. The old sections 34-37 justified one
thing only: using force. That is, an accused could commit an assault in response to an assault and
have a defence. The new section 34 is not limited to defending an accused for committing an
assault. Rather, section 34(1)(b) says that a person is not guilty of an offence for performing “the
act that constitutes the offence”. That is a completely open-ended range of possible responses.

Precisely why an addition to this list had to be labelled “f.1” when the section as a whole had not yet been
proclaimed is something of a mystery.
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For example, an accused threatened by a mob might steal a car and drive quickly away in it: any
of three or four things there – smashing a window, taking the vehicle, driving dangerously,
driving while impaired – might be “the act that constitutes the offence”, and section 34 might
therefore provide a defence to them. An accused might break into a building to avoid an attack,
or forcibly confine the attacker without actually applying force: again, those acts would
constitute offences other than assault, but could fall within section 34. An accused might
discharge a firearm, not at an attacker but as a way of attracting attention or as a distraction:
again, an offence other than assault for which section 34 as now phrased potentially provides a
defence.
Let us return to the chart of defences from Part One, to include the new self-defence provision.

Trigger

Filter

Response

Necessity

an urgent situation of
imminent peril

moral involuntariness

commit some offence

Old self-defence

an assault

reasonableness

commit assault

Duress

a threat of death or
bodily harm unless
one commits a
particular offence

moral involuntariness

commit the particular
offence

New self-defence

force or a threat of
force

reasonableness

commit some offence

It is readily apparent from the last two rows that, just as duress was already contained within
necessity as a special case, it is now also contained within self-defence. The trigger is a threat of
death or bodily harm made for the purpose of compelling a particular offence: that will
necessarily be a threat of force, the trigger for self-defence. Any choice which is morally
involuntary, which is “remorselessly compelled by normal human instincts”, will at a minimum
be a reasonable choice. And the new self-defence provision allows any offence to be committed
for the purpose of protecting oneself from the threat of force. That will be exactly the reason an
accused will have committed the offence in duress: another person said to the accused “rob that
store or I will assault you”, and the “act which constitutes the offence” is robbing the store.
Every element of duress is contained within its corresponding element in self-defence.
In that event, to return to the Venn diagram, the situation has now become this:
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NECESSITY

DURESS
NEW
SELF-DEFENCE

The Court did, in Ryan, explain why self-defence and duress should be kept distinct. In that case,
they were concerned to do so because the accused’s argument, in effect, was to try to expand
duress to encroach on self-defence’s territory. The Court’s primary concern with keeping the two
defences distinct was to explain why that cannot be allowed. Their arguments, however, either
no longer hold true, or do not amount to reasons that self-defence cannot encroach on duress’s
territory.
The first argument was that the self-defence provisions, as noted above, allowed an accused “to
meet force (or threats of force) with force”:79 while true at the time, that is no longer what the
provision does. Second, the Court says, “self-defence is an attempt to stop the victim’s threats or
assaults by meeting force with force; duress is succumbing to the threats by committing an
offence.”80 Once again, this distinction no longer holds true, since succumbing to the threat by
committing a crime could be, under section 34(1)(b), a person’s “act committed for the purpose
of...protecting themselves...from that use or threat of force”. Certainly these are arguments that
one can expect defence counsel to make on appropriate facts, but those “appropriate facts” will
be ones in which duress would previously have been the argument.
The Court’s other bases in Ryan for distinguishing duress from the old self-defence provisions
actually reinforce the argument that the new provision has overtaken duress. Self-defence is
exhaustively codified, they note, while duress is partly a common law defence. The common law
79
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cannot be used to cover supposed “gaps” in an exhaustive codification without frustrating
Parliament’s intention.81 That is an entirely sensible justification for not allowing a common law
defence to encroach on a statutory one. However, if the statutory defence is amended to govern
the situations formerly governed by the common law, then that argument (and section 8(3) of the
Code) says that the common law will give way.
Further, the Court says, self-defence is a justification based on reasonableness while duress is an
excuse based on moral involuntariness. The latter must therefore be a narrower defence,
available in fewer situations: “the justification of self-defence ought to be more readily available
than the excuse of duress”.82 But that rationale – don’t let the narrower defence apply where the
wider should govern – is not a rationale for limiting the application of the wider defence.
One might object that, since self-defence is a justification but duress is an excuse, it is anomalous
to allow potential duress claims to be assessed by section 34. We should hesitate, one might
claim, before saying that a person who commits an offence against some innocent third party is
“justified” simply because it was done in response to threats. That might be so: it is worth noting,
then, that the new section 34 makes no reference at any point to the accused being “justified”.
The language of justification did appear in the repealed self-defence provisions. The new
provision, however, only provides that if its conditions are met, then the person “is not guilty of
an offence”. This is language which encompasses both those justified and those merely excused.
We all think of section 34 as “the new self-defence provision”, which causes us to make certain
assumptions about the circumstances in which it is meant to be used. Those assumptions are not,
however, actually present in the language of the section, and it is the job of judges to apply the
law as it is written. There are circumstances, of course, in which a change in statutory language
is not meant to change the approach to the law in any fundamental way, and so it can become
necessary for courts to decide whether a particular amendment is intended only as a codification
of existing principles or is meant to be remedial and to sound a fresh start.83 It is very clear,
however, that the new self-defence provision is a response to the many implicit and explicit calls
on Parliament from courts to amend the “unbelievably confusing” provisions which have been
Ryan, note 1, para 28: “the courts must take care not to use the flexibility of the common law to develop duress in
ways that circumvent limitations and restrictions imposed by Parliament on the defence of self-defence. This would
amount to judicial abrogation of parts of the Criminal Code.”
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were not just a codification of existing principles but instead a change which had to be read remedially. See also the
Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21, s 12:
Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and
interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.
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replaced.84 There can be no room for doubt that courts are meant to start afresh with the new
provision: the only question is in what way.
In fact the scope of the new provision will be defined by the arguments made by defence
counsel, and the extent to which those arguments succeed with judges. Judicial inertia could no
doubt play a role, but in principle there is no reason that section 34 must end up limited to the
factual circumstances to which the old provisions applied.
As a thought experiment, it is worth considering what would have happened had the new section
34 been in place at the time Nicole Ryan was first brought to trial. Would her counsel have had
any incentive to argue for an unprecedented and unusual interpretation of duress if that statutory
provision had been in place?
Did she believe on reasonable grounds that a threat of force was being made against her or
another person? All three levels of court accept she reasonably believed that her husband “was
threatening to kill her and her daughter”.85
What was the act that constituted the offence? Attempting to hire a hitman. Did she commit that
act for the purpose of protecting herself and her daughter from the threat? Again, the courts
accepted that that was so.
Was that act reasonable in the circumstances? There are many factors listed and room for
argument, but the claim made by the accused and accepted by the courts was that her behaviour
was morally involuntary, that she had no other choice about how to behave. If that is so, it is hard
to see how her choice could be an unreasonable one.
It seems that the accused in Ryan could have used the new section 34 had it been in place.
Indeed, one could make the same argument for Hibbert – he called his friend Cohen to the lobby
(which amounted to committing the offence of aiding an aggravated assault) for the purpose of
protecting himself from Quasi’s use of force – or of Paquette – who drove his co-accused to the
Pop Shoppe (thereby aiding in a murder) for the purpose of protecting himself from their threats
of revenge.
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Even if, on some particular set of facts, an accused’s behaviour does not meet the reasonableness
standard, that does not mean that duress would be available. When self-defence, as now
articulated by section 34, is the governing law in an area, then the result, whether success or
failure, is dictated by that law. This is exactly the point explained by the Court in Ryan:
These distinctive underlying principles of self-defence and duress take on added
significance when we remember that in Canadian law, self-defence is exhaustively
codified, whereas duress is an amalgam of statutory and common law elements. This
means that the courts must take care not to use the flexibility of the common law to
develop duress in ways that circumvent limitations and restrictions imposed by
Parliament on the defence of self-defence. This would amount to judicial abrogation of
parts of the Criminal Code.86
The result of this reasoning when the Code provision has been broadened is that the common law
defence of duress is narrowed – narrowed, I argue, to the point of exclusion.
Conceptually it is equally true that self-defence now overlaps with the statutory defence of
duress: an offence committed under threat of force for failing to commit that offence will be an
offence committed for the purpose of protecting oneself. That overlap could have practical
consequences. Consider, for example, an accused who commits murder under threat: statutory
duress is not available because murder is in the list of exclusions, but self-defence can be pleaded
to murder. As noted earlier, there is some question whether the list can survive Charter scrutiny,
but for the moment it is still in place. In that event such an accused would have the incentive to
look to section 34 rather than section 17 for a defence.
However, it seems unlikely that section 17 has been rendered redundant, precisely because the
argument by the Court in Ryan about not relying on “the flexibility of the common law” does not
apply. Although a new statutory provision can exclude the common law, two statutory provisions
have equal status and must both be given meaning. Under old rules of statutory interpretation one
might argue that the particular takes priority over the general.87 More probably the Court would
apply the modern approach to statutory interpretation that “the words of an Act are to be read in
their entire context...harmoniously with the scheme of the Act”88 to conclude that if section 17
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applies to a subset of those circumstances where section 34 would also apply, then it must be
given a meaning, rather than cease to have any real role. If threats which are contingent on
failing to commit an offence are to be singled out in the Code from other threats and subject to
special requirements, then only if those other requirements are met will a defence be allowed. As
statutory duress and self-defence are both statutory provisions, spheres will need to be found for
each. So, common law duress will disappear but statutory duress will remain.
The irony here is palpable. For forty-six years courts struggled with the impact of Carker, which
led to the bifurcation of duress into two versions, one applying to principals and the other
applying to parties. Finally in the very well-thought-out and sensible decision in Ryan the Court
solved all but a small residual issue, restoring us to the desirable situation of having, in effect,
only one defence of duress which applied to everyone. And then, less than two months later,
Parliament has proclaimed a law which, because of the reasoning in Ryan itself, puts us back in
the position of having one law which governs principals and another which governs parties.
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.
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